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Abstract
We conduct laboratory experiments to study whether increasing the number of
independent public signals in an economy with endogenous private information is
an effective measure to promote the acquisition of information and to enhance price
efficiency. We observe that the release of public information crowds out the traders’
demand for private information under a single disclosure while favoring private in-
formation acquisition under multiple disclosures. The latter measure improves price
accuracy in forecasting the asset fundamental value. However, multiple disclosures
do not eliminate the adverse effect of market overreaction to public information,
becoming a potential source of fragility for the financial system.
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1 Introduction
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the commonly accepted paradigm in Financial Eco-
nomics was characterized by a strong believe in the self-regulating forces of unrestrained
financial markets, the efficiency of asset-price formation, and the increased effectiveness
in risk allocation and sharing through the introduction of ever more complex financial
instruments. Within the efficient market paradigm, trading in stock markets has been
usually associated to the transmission and dissemination of information about the risk
of the underlying assets. Before the crisis, the risk evaluation for such products was out-
sourced to rating agencies and typically, the buyer of CDO tranches would not have spent
any effort himself on information acquisition concerning his far away counterparts. The
information transmission and the effort of gathering independent “pieces” of information,
therefore, seemed to have broken down in the case of structured financial products. The
transition from a decentralized information gathering effort of financial investors to its
outsourcing to rating agencies or other relevant public institutions might have contributed
to enhance the fragility of the entire financial system before the crisis. The optimistic
recommendations of rating agencies, for instance, were “blindly” followed by the vast
majority of investors, which led to a detrimental underestimation of certain risks.
In order to reduce the fragility of the financial system, the disclosure of information
has been at the forefront of regulatory efforts to improve financial market stability. With
the aim at providing an environment with more precise public information, regulatory
measures have been introduced in order to increase the reliability of credit ratings and the
quality and quantity of disclosures of macroeconomic information (see Goldstein et al.,
2014). For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 aims at increasing the general level of transparency, improving financial stabil-
ity and consumers protection (Baily et al., 2017). The European Central Bank further
intensified its forward guidance activity, disclosing more information about its future
monetary policy intentions. However, these measures may have potentially unintended
consequences, reducing considerably their effectiveness. In particular, the disclosures of
regulatory institutions may crowd out traders’ effort to gather independent information,
reducing the information available in the market (Goldstein and Yang, 2019). Further-
more, markets can overreact to disclosures of public information, distorting the asset
prices and transmitting misleading information (Goldstein and Yang, 2019).
One of the issues in the current discussion on the reforms of the financial architec-
ture is related to the way to disclose public information by regulatory institutions (Bank
of England, 2015). The academic literature is quite ambiguous about the overall effect
of disclosures. Although it is well understood that information disclosures can increase
market efficiency, much has been written about their potential unintended consequences.
The crowding out of private information production and the promotion of destabilizing
beauty-contest incentives, are two identified collateral effects of disclosures. In this re-
spect, market over-reaction to public information and traders’ over-reliance on disclosures
have been interpreted as a source of market instability and financial risk.
Effects of disclosures have been modeled within coordination frameworks in the the-
oretical literature (Morris and Shin, 2002; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004, 2007; Myatt and
Wallace, 2011; Colombo et al., 2014) as well as within market frameworks (Kool et al.,
2011; Goldstein and Yang, 2019). Several experimental studies tested the coordination
models in the laboratory, given the impossibility of monitoring information held by eco-
nomic agents in the real world. Their main conclusions support the theoretical conjec-
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tures that decision makers over-rely on public information (Cornand and Heinemann,
2014; Shapiro et al., 2014). Nevertheless, relatively little experimental research has been
conducted to analyze the effects of releasing public information in a market environment.
Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011) find evidence that disclosures crowd out private infor-
mation and reduce price informativeness. They give support to the hypothesis proposed
by Kool et al. (2011) that the reduced price informativeness is a direct consequence of
the crowding out of private information. Alternatively, Ruiz-Buforn et al. (2020) show
that the overweighting of public information is the main cause of the reduction in price
informativeness.
The academic literature is not conclusive about the desirability and the effects that
public disclosures have on an economy with endogenous private information. In this re-
spect, our paper contributes to the literature by exploring measures to reduce financial
risks caused by public release of information in financial markets. Particularly, we aim
at devising more robust market architectures trying to make sure that private informa-
tion (and private information acquisition) is not discarded by market participants in the
presence of public information. In our contribution, we try to shed some light on pros
and cons of different disclosure configurations, answering to the questions: What types
of disclosure are most beneficial to promote market efficiency and reduce the financial
risk related to market overreaction? What is the effect of disclosures in an economy with
endogenous private information?
With this objective, we conduct laboratory experiments using an information market
because of its capability for aggregating information and providing accurate predictions on
fundamentals (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Healy et al., 2010; Page and Clemen, 2013). In
particular, we compare different configurations of disclosures varying the number and the
relative precision of independent public signals. Our results suggest that releasing public
information does not necessarily improve market efficiency when traders have access to
costly private information. The way information is disclosed affects private information
acquisition with the consequent risk of price distortions: a single disclosure crowds out
information acquisition while multiple disclosures might increase traders’ information
acquisition. This effect on traders’ information acquisition translates into a significant
over-reaction to disclosures, that might lead to a reduction in the price accuracy. We claim
that studying how market reacts to different configurations of information disclosure is
fundamental for understanding how to regulate financial markets.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related
literature and introduces the working hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and procedure. Section 4 presents the results of the impact of the disclosures on
the information and asset market, as well as on price accuracy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical background
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) state that, under rational expectations, decision makers
have neither incentives to acquire costly information nor to trade when prices are fully
informative. Competitive markets, therefore, cannot be informationally efficient if all
information is instantaneously aggregated in the price, as stated in the strong version of
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) solve this paradox
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by introducing some noise in the market. In their version of a noisy rational expectations
equilibrium model (REE), prices are just partially informative, giving to traders incentives
to acquire costly information since they can recover their costs. In his seminal paper,
Sunder (1992) tests experimentally some consequences of the noisy REE, showing that
a double auction mechanism generates an endogenous noise to prevent prices to fully
reveal information. In particular, he shows that the noisy REE can be attained under
quite restrictive conditions, such as perfect information and a known number of insiders.
Many additional experimental contributions have tested the consequences of the noisy
REE, showing that information aggregation is imperfect, and, as a consequence, market
prices are just partial indicators of the fundamental value.1 Regarding the experimental
analysis of the conditions enhancing market efficiency, we focus attention on the release of
public information as a possible instrument to help price convergence to the fundamental
value. Until now, very little research effort has been devoted to this important issue.
2.2 Hypotheses
We will analyze the impact of releasing public information in a laboratory asset market.
Our research question primarily focuses on the study of the effect of different disclosure
scenarios on market performance. In particular, we consider alternative configurations
when introducing public signals with different precision into a financial market. In an
economy where investors have access to costly private information, we analyze how in-
creasing the number of independent released public signals affects: (i) traders’ acquisition
of private information, (ii) efficiency and accuracy of market prices, and (iii) traders’ prof-
its.
Regarding the traders’ effort to gather information, we conjecture that it is the ag-
gregate precision of public information that affects the traders’ demand for private in-
formation. Note that our conjecture is a direct consequence of the EMH, since it is the
overall information available to the traders, and not the way is released, which determines
market prices.
Hypothesis 1 The demand for private information depends on the Bayesian aggregate
precision of public information.
In other words, it is not relevant whether a given aggregate precision of public in-
formation is achieved by releasing a single signal or multiple (independent) signals of
different precision. An important aftermath of this hypothesis implies that there is no
role in the implementation of alternative disclosing scenarios when managing the release
of public information.
The economic literature predicts that traders’ demand for information strongly de-
pends on their initial information. Several theoretical models state that information dis-
closures reduce the production of costly information. See, for example, Diamond (1985);
Kool et al. (2011); Colombo et al. (2014); Han et al. (2016) and Goldstein and Yang
(2019). Moreover, recent experimental studies show that traders endowed with precise
and conclusive initial information reduce their effort in gathering new information (Page
and Siemroth, 2017; Ruiz-Buforn et al., 2020). We, therefore, conjecture that, when con-
clusive, the presence of public information has a negative effect on the demand for private
information.
1See Sunder (1995) and Plott (2000) for a survey.
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Hypothesis 2 The release of conclusive public information crowds out private informa-
tion.
Concerning the traders’ behavior in the asset market, experimental contributions have
repeatedly found limited aggregation of information into prices, which turns into price
deviations from fundamentals. Nevertheless, many contributions show that more in-
formation in the market leads to higher price informativeness and price accuracy (e.g.
Sunder (1992); Bossaerts et al. (2014); Page and Siemroth (2017); Corgnet et al. (2018);
Alfarano et al. (2020)). We define as price informativeness a measure of the informational
content of prices, while price accuracy measures how well prices predict the asset value.
Under the EMH, we expect prices to be closer to the fundamentals the more information
is available to the traders.
Hypothesis 3 More information in the market improves price accuracy.
Furthermore, following the EMH, we conjecture that the configuration of disclosures
do not affect price informativeness, since it should be independent of the quantity or
quality of the information available to the traders.
Hypothesis 4 Price informativeness does not depend on the configuration of disclosures.
On the other hand, market prices may overreact to the release of public information
and deviate significantly from fundamentals, as conjectured by Allen et al. (2006) and
Goldstein and Yang (2019). An existing strand of the theoretical as well as experimental
literature relates such deviations from fundamentals to the overweighting of public in-
formation in market prices due to the over-reliance of traders to information disclosures.
While the theoretical literature counts with several contributions, the experimental lit-
erature regarding the overweighting in laboratory asset market experiments is scarce.2
Ackert et al. (2004) report the existence of market overreaction to low precise disclo-
sures. In a recent study, Ruiz-Buforn et al. (2020) find experimental evidence about the
overweighting of public information when disclosed as a single signal. Moreover, they
note that this effect is reinforced by the crowding out on the traders’ demand for private
information. Those experiments report a non monotonic relation between the quantity of
information present in the market and the price informativeness. We formulate, therefore,
an alternative hypothesis to Hypotheses 3 and 4:
Hypothesis 5 Market prices overweight public information, resulting in a reduction of
price informativeness.
In a noisy REE framework, informed traders can make profits only to cover informa-
tion acquisition costs, as prices only partially reveal information to uninformed traders.
We should expect, therefore, that informed traders can recover the cost of information
acquisition, gaining the same net profits as uninformed traders. Nevertheless, some ex-
perimental contributions report that uninformed traders outperform informed traders
(Huber et al., 2011; Page and Siemroth, 2017; Ruiz-Buforn et al., 2020).
Hypothesis 6 Informed traders gain the same profit as uninformed traders.
2The vast majority of experimental papers on the overweighting of public information are based on
the seminal paper of Morris and Shin in a beauty contest framework (see, for example, Cornand and
Heinemann, 2014; Shapiro et al., 2014; Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2014, 2016), which is not a market
environment.
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3 Experimental design and procedure
Our experimental setting is similar to other contributions from the literature on labora-
tory financial markets and prediction markets.3 We implement an asset market populated
by 15 traders.4 At the beginning of each market, traders are endowed with 1000 units
of experimental currency (ECU)5 and 10 risky assets, paying a dividend D when mar-
ket close. The assets have a one-market life. The asset market is implemented as a 3
minute double auction where traders can submit bids and asks or directly accept any
other trader’s outstanding offer. Every bid, ask or transaction concerns only one unit of
the asset, but every trader can handle as many as desired as long as he/she has enough
cash or assets (no short sale is allowed).
States of nature Before the market starts, the computer randomly determines one of
the two equiprobable states on nature. In one state of nature the dividend is 0 and in
the other is 10, D ∈ {0, 10}. The asset value at the end of the market is equal to the
dividend. At the end of the market, the realization of the state of nature is revealed and
assets pay the corresponding dividend. It is common knowledge to all traders that the
two states of nature are equiprobable.
Private Information Endogenous private information is implemented in an informa-
tion market. At any moment during the 3 minutes of the market, traders can acquire
imperfect information about the value of the dividend. They can acquire (independent)
private signals at the cost of 4 ECU each. Each private signal takes the value 0 or 10,
si ∈ {0, 10}, and it is correct with probability p, and incorrect with probability q = 1−p.
We refer to p as the precision of the signal. We set p = 0.6 in all treatments.
Disclosures In markets where public information is released, traders observe, at the
beginning of each market, either one or two imperfect public signals about the value of
the dividend. We refer to those public signals as disclosures. Each public signal takes
the value 0 or 10, S ∈ {0, 10}, being correct with probability P , and incorrect with
probability Q = 1 − P . It is common knowledge among traders the value of P and the
realizations of the disclosures. We refer to P as the precision of the public signal.
Treatments We implement different treatments varying the number of disclosures and
their precision. Our experimental setting allows us to test the consequences that different
disclosure scenarios have on the traders’ information acquisition, the efficiency of the
market in aggregating information into prices, and traders’ profits. Table 1 summarizes
the implemented treatments. In the Baseline treatment (B), no public signal is released.
In the Single disclosure treatment (S), one public signal with a precision of PA = 0.8
is released. Then, we implement three additional treatments where two independent
public signals are released: (i) Multiple Symmetric disclosures treatment (MS), where
two public signals with equal precision (PA = PB = 0.66) are released at the beginning of
each market; (ii) Multiple Weak Asymmetric Disclosures treatment (MWA), where the
precision of the two public signals is PA = 0.64 and PB = 0.70; (iii) Multiple Strong
Asymmetric Disclosures treatment (MSA), where the precision of the two public signals
is PA = 0.6 and PB = 0.75.
3See, for example, Ackert et al. (2002); Hey and Morone (2004); Ferri and Morone (2008); Deck et al.
(2013); Fellner and Theissen (2014); Page and Siemroth (2017) and Halim et al. (2019).
410 markets out of the 20 markets included in the Single disclosure treatment are populated by 10
traders.
5Earnings, as well as asset value and dividend, during the experiments were designated in experimental
currency units (ECU) and converted into e at the end of the session.
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Table 1: Experimental design and parameters. With p we denote the precision of a
private signal, and PA and PB denote the precision of each individual public signal, when
present.
Treatment p PA PB ♯ of markets
B 0.6 - - 20
S 0.6 0.8 - 20
MS 0.6 0.66 0.66 30
MWA 0.6 0.64 0.70 20
MSA 0.6 0.6 0.75 20
In the treatments with multiple disclosures, the joint precision of the public informa-
tion depends on whether disclosures are convergent or divergent. We consider disclosures
as convergent when the two public signals point to the same dividend value, whereas we
consider disclosures as divergent, if they point to opposite values of the dividend. Using
the Bayesian inference, we compute the probability that the asset value is equal to 10 as
a function of the realizations of the public signals SA and SB:
Pr(D = 10|SA, SB) =
[
1 +
(
QA
PA
)SA (QB
PB
)SB]−1
, (1)
where Pr(D = 10|SA, SB) is the probability of the event D = 10, given the realization
of the public signals SA and SB. The variables SA and SB take the value 1 (−1) if the
public signal suggests an asset value equal to 10 (0), while they take the value 0 if there is
no public signal. Mutatis mutandis, we can compute the probability of the event D = 0.
Table 2 shows the probability of the event D = 10 given the realizations of the public
signals SA and SB for each one of the implemented treatments.
Table 2: Probability of the event D = 10 given the configuration of the public signals.
PA and PB (SA and SB) denote the precision (configurations) of the disclosures.
Treatment PA PB SA SB Pr(D = 10|SA, SB)
B 0.6 - 0 0 0.5
MSd 0.66 0.66 1 -1 0.5
MWAd 0.64 0.70 1 -1 0.57
MSAd 0.6 0.75 1 -1 0.66
S 0.8 - 1 0 0.8
MSc 0.66 0.66 1 1 0.8
MWAc 0.64 0.70 1 1 0.81
MSAc 0.6 0.75 1 1 0.82
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Our experimental setting allows us to study how the different configurations of the dis-
closures affect the outcome of the information market and the asset market. In particular,
we can evaluate whether the relative precision of the two public signals, in the multiple
disclosure treatments, affects the market performance. In the treatments with asymmet-
ric disclosures, we can study different stylized scenarios where the disclosures released by
regulatory institutions have different relative precision. In the Multiple Strong Asymmet-
ric treatment, in particular, we can analyze the effect of releasing one “dominant” public
signal on market performance. Such stylized scenarios describe the prominent role of a
leading regulatory institution releasing public information, like central banks, parallel to
other sources releasing noisier information. Note that the less precise signal has the same
precision as a single private signal. Contrary to a single disclosure, multiple disclosures
might be divergent, allowing us to study the reaction of the market to two opposite public
forecasts about the value of the dividend.
Considering the Baseline treatment as a benchmark, we can study the impact of a
single disclosure of a given precision (B vs S). Furthermore, we can confront those results
with the disclosure of two convergent signals of equal or different precision (S vs MSc,
S vs MWAc and S vs MSAc). Note that in treatments S, MSAc, MWAc and MSc,
the overall precision of public information is approximately invariant and close to 0.8
(see Table 2). Additionally, a direct comparison can be performed between MSd and B
treatments.
Procedure The experiment was conducted at the Laboratori d’Economia Experimen-
tal at University Jaume I in Castello´n. We recruited 159 undergraduate students from
Economics, Finance, and Business Administration in at least their second year of study.
Each subject only participated in one session that consisted of 10 markets. When sub-
jects arrived at the laboratory, instructions were distributed and explained aloud. This
was followed by one practice market for subjects to get familiar with the software, which
was programmed using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).6 After each market, div-
idends were paid out and subjects’ profit was computed as the difference between their
initial money endowment and the money held at the end of the trading period. Each
subject’s final payoff was computed as the accumulated profit in all markets, and paid
cash at the end of the session.7
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the activity in the information and asset markets in
the five treatments. On average, traders acquire between 0.83 and 2.26 signals depending
on the treatment. The fewest acquisitions correspond to treatment S, where the public
information is released as a single disclosure, while the most acquisitions are in MS treat-
ment, where two independent and equally precise public signals are released. Moreover,
we observe that, depending on the treatment, between 42% and 67% of traders acquire
6Translated instructions and screenshots in the implemented treatments are available upon request.
7One experimental currency unit is equivalent to 2 cents of e. The average payoff was about 20e
and each session lasted around 90 minutes. Note that subjects could make losses. To avoid some of
the problems associated with subjects making real losses in experiments, we endowed all subjects with
a participation fee of 5e. No subject earned a negative final payoff in any session.
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at least one private signal in the information market. Again, S treatment presents the
lowest proportion of informed traders while the largest number of informed traders is in
MS treatment. Regarding the activity in the asset market, we observe a wide variability
of trading volume across treatments, with the most trades in treatment B.
Table 3: Summary statistics
B S MS MSA MWA
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Informed tradersa 0.42 0.08 0.46 0.21 0.67 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.57 0.12
Acquired signals 1.32 2.24 0.83 1.25 2.26 3.04 0.84 1.14 1.44 1.99
Trading volume 138.70 25.48 109.60 23.19 52.13 25.52 86.45 13.09 65.35 14.04
Gross Profit 50.00 76.19 39.52 83.59 39.55 89.54 55.00 71.92 50.00 64.23
Net Profit 44.73 75.94 36.40 83.09 30.51 91.50 51.64 71.22 44.23 63.99
Observations 300 250 440 300 300
aInformed traders refers the fraction of traders acquiring at least one signal.
4.2 Information Market: Information acquisition and market
informativeness
4.2.1 Information acquisition
We start our analysis looking into the traders’ behavior in the information market consid-
ering two dimensions: (i) the number of acquired signals per capita and (ii) the informa-
tion market participation rate, computed as the fraction of informed traders.8 Further-
more, we distinguish all possible disclosure scenarios, namely absence of public signal,
single public signal and multiple convergent and divergent signals. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of the per capita demand for private information, whereas Figure 2 illus-
trates the information market participation rate as a function of the different disclosure
scenarios.
We focus first on the traders’ per capita demand for private information as a function
of the aggregate precision of the public information. According to Hypothesis 1 the
demand for private information should be roughly homogeneous in those scenarios with
similar aggregate precision of public information.
A first glance at Figure 1 reveals that we can reject Hypothesis 1. Keeping con-
stant the aggregate precision, we observe significant differences in the demand for pri-
vate information depending on the configuration of the disclosures. In particular, for a
given aggregate precision of the public information, traders acquire a significantly larger
amount of private information in treatment MSd when compared to treatment B, and in
treatments MSc and MWAc when compared to treatment S.
9 Comparing the markets
with multiple convergent disclosures, the demand for information (in median) steadily
increases the more symmetric is the precision of the two public signals. The relative
precision of the two public signals is therefore an important determinant of the traders’
8We define as informed a trader who purchases at least one private signal in a given market.
9A Mann-Whitney (MW hereafter) tests: B vs MSd p < 0.01; S vs MSc p < 0.01; S vs MWAc
p = 0.00.
8
01
2
3
4
Ac
qu
ire
d 
sig
na
ls 
PC
B MSA MWA MS
Divergent
S MSA MWA MS
Convergent
Figure 1: Per capita information acquisi-
tion.
0
20
40
60
80
100
In
fo
rm
ed
 tr
ad
er
s 
(%
)
B MSA MWA MS
Divergent
S MSA MWA MS
Convergent
Figure 2: Information market participation
rate.
demand for private information. We conclude that, despite having the same aggregate
precision, the configuration of the disclosures does affect the traders’ effort to gather
private information.
Result 1 Given the aggregate precision of disclosures, releasing public information with
a single or multiple disclosures plays a role in the traders’ effort to gather private infor-
mation.
An interesting result is that the traders’ demand for private information is not sig-
nificantly different in treatments S and MSA, independently of the two signals being
convergent or divergent. Our results are, therefore, not compatible with an aggregation
of public information using a Bayesian rule implied by eq. (1).10 Such deviation from a
Bayesian aggregation leads us to conjecture that, in markets with multiple strong asym-
metric disclosures, prices overweight the higher-precise signal while they underweight the
lower-precise signal. In simple terms, the more precise public signal can be considered a
“dominant” signal. We will come back to this point in Section 4.3.1.
Turning now to Hypothesis 2, it states that if the public information is conclusive,
this should crowd out the demand for private information. We should therefore ob-
serve that traders acquire fewer signals in all configurations but MSd, compared to the
Baseline treatment. We can reject Hypothesis 2 since the release of multiple symmetric
signals, either divergent or convergent, crowds in private information. At the same time,
no crowding-out effect is observed in case of multiple weak asymmetric and convergent
disclosures.11 Instead, we observe a clear crowding out of private information in those
markets with a single disclosure or multiple strong asymmetric disclosures. This speaks
in favor of our conjecture about the dominance of the more precise signal.
10In this respect, it is striking the significant difference between the B and MSd treatments. In these
markets, two divergent and equally precise signals should be informationally equivalent to the absence
of a public release.
11A MW test shows that the number of acquired signals is significantly larger in treatment MS than in
treatment B, regardless whether the signals are convergent or divergent (MW test, p < 0.01). Comparing
treatment B to treatment MWAc, a MW test shows no significant difference in the demand for private
information.
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Result 2 The disclosure of information crowds out private information if a single or
multiple strong asymmetric signals are released.
Figure 2 reveals that the information market participation rate also depends on the
particular configuration of disclosures. Releasing multiple signals increases the participa-
tion of traders in the information market with respect to the absence of public informa-
tion.12
Result 3 The disclosure of multiple signals increases the information market participa-
tion rate.
4.2.2 Market Informativeness
Given the impact that releasing public information has on the traders’ information ac-
quisition, particularly considering the role of the crowding-out effect, we address the
following question: Is the release of public information neutral, beneficial or detrimental
for the overall market informativeness?
We measure market informativeness as the distance between the asset value and the
Fully Revealing price FRt, which is the expected price when all information (public and
private) is aggregated. Let Ht =
∑t
i=1 si denote the net private information available up
to time t in a market, given the sequence of realizations of the private signals acquired
up to time t. SA and SB denote the realization of public signals, if present. The Fully
Revealing price can be computed as:13
FRt = 10 Pr(D = 10|Ht, SA, SB) = 10
[
1 +
(
QA
PA
)SA (QB
PB
)SB (q
p
)Ht]−1
. (2)
We compute market informativeness EFRD as:
14
EFRD =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|FRt −D|
10
. (3)
Figure 3 confirms that market informativeness significantly improves in case of con-
vergent multiple disclosures compared to a single disclosure.15 However, it is worth to
note that a single disclosure does not improve market informativeness compared to the
market with no public information.16
Result 4 Disclosures, at worst, leave invariant market informativeness. Market infor-
mativeness significantly improves when multiple convergent signals are released.
12MW test shows that the information market participation rate in B treatment and in MWA, MSA
and MS treatments is significantly different, both for convergent and divergent signals (MW, p = 0.00).
13We redefine the variables si, SA and SB . They will take the value 1 (−1) if the signal’s realization
is equal to 10 (0).
14We average EFRD over the last trading minute when the activity in the information market is low.
Traders acquire between zero and few signals depending on the market. Therefore, the Fully Revealing
price is almost constant over time. The results are robust with respect to the considered time interval.
We divided by 10 in order to normalize all distances to be between 0 and 1.
15MW tests: S vs MSAc p < 0.05; S vs MWAc p < 0.05; S vs MSc p < 0.01.
16MW test: S vs B p = 0.43
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Figure 3: Market informativeness: convergent vs divergent public disclosures.
4.3 Asset Market
We focus now on the asset market, analyzing first how prices aggregate private and public
information held by traders. Next, we measure price accuracy to test whether the release
of public information renders market prices better predictors for the asset value.
4.3.1 Aggregation of information into prices: Price informativeness
If market informativeness remains constant or improves when public information is re-
leased, how is private and public information reflected in market prices? How do the
considered configurations of disclosures affect the aggregation of information into prices?
To assess the performance of prices to aggregate private as well as public information,
we consider two benchmarks: (i) the fully revealing benchmark, FR from eq. (2) and
(ii) the public benchmark, PB, defined as the expected price conditional on the value
of the released public signals, i.e. PB = 10 · Pr(D = 10|SA, SB) (see eq. (1)). Note
that both benchmarks depend on the realizations of the public signals. However, the
fully revealing benchmark weights the public and the private signals according to their
precision, whereas the public benchmark assigns zero weight to private information.
We introduce two indicators to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the two benchmarks:
(i) the PI indicator is a measure of the distance between observed prices and the fully
revealing benchmark, and (ii) PP is a measure of the distance between observed prices
and the public benchmark PB:17
PI =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|Pricet − FRt|
10
, (4)
PP =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|Pricet − PB|
10
. (5)
17See footnote 14 for further explanations on the formulas (4) and (5).
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Figure 4: Aggregation of information in each market by treatment and configurations of
disclosures.
The PI indicator allows us to evaluate how prices aggregate information across the
different configuration of disclosures. It is a measure of the price informativeness. In
line with the existing literature in Experimental Finance, our results confirm that prices
imperfectly aggregate the information available to the traders.
Result 5 Prices imperfectly aggregate the information available to the traders.
Looking at Figure 4, we can reject Hypothesis 4, since price informativeness significantly
differ across the different configurations of disclosures. In particular, price informative-
ness worsens significantly in the case of a single disclosure, whereas multiple the strong
asymmetric convergent disclosure outperforms all other configurations in terms of price
informativeness.18 We can, therefore, conclude:
Result 6 The configuration of disclosures affects price informativeness.
We observe some discrepancies between the market informativeness and the price
informativeness, indicating some degree of inefficiency in aggregating information into
prices. In particular, we observe that those markets with convergent multiple disclo-
sures exhibit a similar level of market informativeness (see Figure 3), while they differ
significantly concerning their price informativeness (see Figure 4). Moreover, in Figure
3, markets with a single disclosure and absence of public information exhibit a similar
market informativeness. Price informativeness, instead, is significantly lower in the case
of a single disclosure (MW p < 0.05).
In order to explain such discrepancies, we rely on Hypothesis 5, which states that
prices systematically weight public information above its precision, leading to a reduction
18MW tests: S vs B p < 0.05; MSAc vs all other disclosures p < 0.05, except MWAc that is p < 0.1.
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in price informativeness. Comparing the indicators PI and PP allow us to detect the
overweighting of public information. When the PP indicator significantly outperforms
the PI indicator, it suggests that prices overweight public information.
Figure 4 supports our conjecture on the overweighting of public information in most
of the configurations of disclosures. We cannot reject Hypothesis 5 in treatment S (one-
side sign test, p = 0.00). This result also extends to the behavior of prices in the MS
treatment, regardless of whether disclosures are conclusive or inconclusive (one-side sign
tests, p ≤ 0.05). The observed overweighting effect in treatment MS is particularly
relevant, since the crowding-in of private information significantly improves the market
informativeness in those markets. However, the enhanced market informativeness is not
sufficient to overcome the strong influence that symmetric convergent disclosures have on
prices.
Nevertheless, further analysis is needed for those markets with multiple asymmetric
disclosures. Recall that, in those treatments, the two public signals have a different
precision: in treatment MWA the precisions are 64% and 70%, whereas in treatment
MSA the precisions are 60% and 75%. From Table 2, we can see that, if convergent,
their joint (Bayesian) precision is 81% and 82%, respectively. Instead, when divergent
their Bayesian precision reduces to 57% and 66%, respectively. It might occur that, in
case of being divergent, prices follow the “dominant” signal. To measure this effect, we
introduce two additional “public benchmarks”, where the public signals are considered
individually to account for price formation19. Figure 5 shows that in the treatment MSA,
when signals are divergent, the public benchmark PP75 better describes prices compared
to the Fully Revealing benchmark (sign test, p = 0.06). In this case, prices overweight
the “dominant” signal. Conversely, we do not observe the dominance of the more precise
signal in case of treatment MWA in Figure 6. Note, however, that the released signals are
weakly asymmetric. The most precise public signal is, in fact, slightly more informative
than the other public signal. We can conclude that, when releasing information in a
financial market, the overweighting phenomenon is a very pervasive effect.
Result 7 The overweighting phenomenon is a quite robust effect of the release of public
information.
4.3.2 Ability of prices to predict the asset value: Price accuracy
We define the price error DP as the absolute difference between market prices and the
asset value, DP = |Pricet − D|. We consider the mean price error as a proxy for
price accuracy.20 We divide the time interval of a market in 6 time intervals. Figure 8
illustrates the time evolution of the price error (see Bossaerts et al., 2014) averaged in
different subsequent time-intervals, computed as:
EDPj =
1
T
jT∑
t=1+(j−1)T
|Pricet −D|
10
j = 1, 2, ..6 . (6)
19Essentially, we consider the conditional probability of the event D = 10 conditionally on the value
of each single public signal taken individually. Then we compute the goodness-of-fit of such benchmark,
following eq. (5). For example, we refer with PP75 to the PP indicator considering just the public signal
with precision P = 0.75.
20Figures from 9 to 14 in the appendix A display the time evolution of the price error in each market.
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In figures 7 and 8, we compare the time evolution of the price accuracy with the equivalent
time evolution of the market informativeness per treatment. The latter is computed as:
EMIj =
1
T
jT∑
t=1+(j−1)T
|FRt −D|
10
j = 1, 2, ..6 . (7)
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Figure 7: Time evolution of market infor-
mativeness per treatment. Vertical bars de-
pict 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 8: Time evolution of price accuracy
per treatment. Vertical bars depict 95%
confidence interval.
A first glance to both figures shows a close correspondence between the quantity of
information present in the market and the price accuracy. Therefore, we cannot reject
Hypothesis 3, which states that a higher price accuracy is achieved with more informa-
tion into the market. In particular, we observe that the lowest level of price accuracy is
achieved in the Single disclosure treatment, which is characterized by the highest magni-
tude of the crowding-out effect (see Figure 1) and the strongest overweighting effect (see
Figure 4). Both are detrimental effects for price accuracy. The treatments with multiple
disclosures exhibit the highest level of price accuracy, significantly higher than the Single
disclosure and the B treatment, when we confront the corresponding values in the last
time subinterval (see the error bars in Figure 8).
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Result 8 Multiple disclosures drive market prices systematically closer to the fundamen-
tals than the single disclosure.
Interestingly, the treatments with multiple disclosures exhibits similar levels of price
accuracy, despite a significantly different level of market informativeness (see the error
bars in Figure 7). In particular, the crowding-in effect we observe in the MS treatment
does not translate into a higher level of price accuracy. Given the similar level of price
accuracy of the treatments with multiple disclosures, the MSA disclosure guarantees the
lowest private information gathering effort.
Result 9 Given the price accuracy, the strong asymmetric multiple disclosure is charac-
terized by the lowest aggregate cost in information acquisition.
4.4 Profits
Hypothesis 6 states that, in a noisy REE framework, informed traders can generate
a sufficient level of gross profits to recover the cost of information acquisition. As a
consequence, we should observe no significant difference in traders’ net profit between
informed and uninformed traders.
The net profit of trader i in market m is given by:
NetProfitmi = (C
180
mi − C
0) +Dm · Assets
180
mi , (8)
where (C180mi −C
0) is the cash held at the end of the market after paying back the initial
endowment C0, and Assets180mi denotes the number of assets held at the end of the market.
Dm denotes the value of the asset at the end of market m.
Table 4 reports the mean and standard deviation of gross and net profits of informed
and uninformed traders in each treatment depending on the configurations of disclosures.
On average, informed traders gain systematically higher gross profits than uninformed
traders, except in MSd. However, after accounting information costs, they gain lower
net profits than uninformed traders in most of the treatments. These differences suggest
that the configuration of disclosures affects informed traders’ ability to recover the cost
of acquiring information through trading.
Table 4: Gross profit and net profit per configuration of disclosures.
Gross Profit Net Profit
Informed Uninformed Informed Uninformed
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
B 54.2 74.1 46.9 77.7 41.7 73.6 46.9 77.7
S 48.1 100.5 37.2 68.92 35.4 97.4 37.2 68.9
MSAc 60.5 75.7 35.0 51.1 53.4 75.8 35.0 51.1
MSAd 80.4 98.5 57.8 46.8 74.1 97.8 57.8 46.8
MWAc 70.7 70.9 55.9 52.8 59.8 71.0 55.9 52.8
MWAd 35.8 66.5 29.0 53.0 26.6 66.4 29.0 53.0
MSc 55.7 92.3 46.5 88.5 42.7 95.0 46.5 88.5
MSd 22.4 89.1 23.9 74.9 8.4 91.7 23.9 74.9
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To provide further insights into the effect that the configuration of disclosures has
on traders’ net profit, we regress traders’ net profit considering as explanatory variables
dummies for the different configurations of disclosures, using as a baseline the traders’
profits in treatment B. Table 5 reports the results of the regressions.
Models I and II show no significant differences in net profits in most of the config-
urations with convergent disclosures. Conversely, in markets with divergent disclosures,
traders’ gain significantly higher profits in case of strong asymmetric signals, whereas in
markets with weak asymmetric or symmetric disclosures, traders profits are significantly
lower compared to treatment B.
In Models III and IV, we regress traders’ net profit considering as independent vari-
ables the number of acquired signals. We cannot reject Hypothesis 6 in the configurations
with convergent disclosures, since informed traders do not gain higher profits compared
to uninformed traders. Recall that market informativeness and price accuracy is higher
in the markets with convergent disclosures and, therefore, it is more difficult for them to
outperform uninformed traders gaining higher net profits. Instead, in those markets with
divergent disclosures, traders’ profit differ between informed and uninformed traders.
In treatment MSAd informed traders outperform uninformed traders gaining net profits,
whereas in treatmentsMWAd andMSd informed traders gain lower net profits compared
to uninformed traders. To explain these results, we consider the different level of market
informativeness in those markets. In markets with divergent and strong asymmetric dis-
closures, a significant crowding-out of private information is observed. As a consequence,
market informativeness worsens in these markets allowing informed traders get an advan-
tage over uninformed traders. On the contrary, in markets with divergent and symmetric
disclosures, a crowding-in in the demand for private information is observed, increasing
significantly market informativeness. As a result, in these markets traders’ investment
on private information is too high to recover the cost of information through trading
in the asset market. Consequently, informed traders gain lower net profits compared to
uninformed traders.
Result 10 In markets with convergent disclosures there is a tendency to observe the
same net profits for informed and uninformed traders.
Result 11 In markets with divergent disclosures informed traders’ might outperform un-
informed traders if market informativeness is low.
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Table 5: OLS regression results for net profits.
Dependent variable: Net Profit
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
S -8.333 -8.333
(6.849) (8.377)
MSAc -1.701 -1.701
(6.324) (6.449)
MSAd 22.883** 22.883**
(9.067) (9.918)
MWAc 13.205** 13.205**
(6.565) (6.608)
MWAd -17.270** -17.270**
(6.880) (6.701)
MSc -0.637 -0.637
(7.337) (9.102)
MSd -31.775*** -31.775***
(7.675) (9.510)
Acq.Signals in B -0.476 -0.476
(1.800) (1.933)
Acq.Signals in S 3.391 3.391
(6.473) (8.064)
Acq.Signals in MSAc 3.250 3.250
(4.312) (4.188)
Acq.Signals in MSAd 17.043** 17.043**
(7.658) (7.423)
Acq.Signals in MWAc 2.925 2.925
(2.265) (2.251)
Acq.Signals in MWAd -4.713* -4.713*
(2.798) (2.496)
Acq.Signals in MSc -3.975 -3.975
(2.698) (3.255)
Acq.Signals in MSd -9.004*** -9.004***
(2.478) (1.643)
Constant 44.733*** 44.733*** 43.139*** 43.139***
(4.388) (5.456) (2.225) (2.664)
Cluster SE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590
Clusters 169 169
R2 0.031 0.031 0.039 0.039
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1.
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5 Conclusion
We experimentally investigate to what extent the new regulation related to the the dis-
closure of public information in financial markets, put in place after the 2008 financial
crisis, is effective. Its basic goals are to enhance the precision of public information re-
leased by regulatory institutions and to incentivize the effort of investors in gathering
alternative information to develop their own systems of risk evaluation and management.
The potential twin-increase in the availability of information due to the new regulation,
from the public and private domains, should, in principle, improve the stability of the
whole financial system, avoiding overreliance on few exogenous signals (e.g. credit rat-
ing agencies). To test those sound ideas, we conduct an asset market experiment with
endogenous private information. In other words, traders decide how much information
to acquire at a given cost and, at the same time, they trade a risky asset, whose value
depends on a random state of nature. Using this setting, we compare different disclo-
sure policies, keeping constant its precision, while varying the configuration of the public
signals released in the market. We find that the way public information is released has
relevant consequences for the market performance: it has a strong impact on traders’
demand for private information and affects significantly price efficiency. The theoretical
arguments based on the EMH suggest, on the contrary, that the different configurations
in disclosing public information should not affect neither the asset market efficiency nor
the traders’ effort in gathering private information.
Our results show that single disclosures crowd out private information, bringing mar-
ket prices far from fundamentals. Conversely, we find that, when the release of public
information is performed in multiple disclosures, the traders’ effort to acquire private in-
formation increases. However, more information in the market does not always translate
into a more efficient price system.
In line with the previous literature, we find that prices only partially aggregate the
information available to the traders. We further observe that information disclosures
might have unintended consequences, reducing their effectiveness and increasing the fi-
nancial risk of persistent deviations from fundamentals. The market overreacts to a single
disclosure creating a source of price distortion. Instead, when increasing the number of in-
stitutions releasing public information, we observe a reduction in the overweighting effect
and an increase in price accuracy. In these markets, prices are, in fact, good predictors
of the realization of the future state of nature, driving markets close to fundamentals.
We conclude that, if the objective of the regulator is to reduce the outsourcing of the
investors’ information gathering effort (like in the case of the few credit rating agencies),
increasing the number of institutions releasing public information is an effective policy
measure.
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A Market price accuracy
Every panel plots the evolution of the price accuracy. In order to render the markets
with different dividends comparable, in fact, we plot the price accuracy DP = |D−price|
instead of transaction prices (solid line), and smoothed price accuracy (thick-solid line).
We also show the time evolution the difference between dividend and fully revealing
price (dotted line), DFR = |D − FR|, and the difference between dividend and public
benchmark (dashed line), DPB = |D − PB|. The horizontal axis shows the time (in
seconds) at which the transaction took place. The number at the caption of each panel
identifies the market.
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Figure 9: Trading activity over time in Treatment B (group 1).
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Figure 10: Trading activity over time in Treatment B (group 2).
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Figure 11: Trading activity over time in Treatment S (group 1).
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Figure 12: Trading activity over time in Treatment S (group 2).
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Figure 13: Trading activity over time in Treatment MSA (group 1).
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Figure 14: Trading activity over time in Treatment MSA (group 2).
24
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 60 120 180 0 60 120 180 0 60 120 180 0 60 120 180 0 60 120 180
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
DP DPB DFR
Seconds
MWA (Group 1)
Figure 15: Trading activity over time in Treatment MWA (group 1).
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Figure 16: Trading activity over time in Treatment MWA (group 2).
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Figure 17: Trading activity over time in Treatment MS (group 1).
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Figure 18: Trading activity over time in Treatment MS (group 2).
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Figure 19: Trading activity over time in Treatment MS (group 3).
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